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An assessment of Incentive Regulation in electricity networks: The story so far / Haikel Khalfallah / Grenoble : EDDEN (2013)
Titre : An assessment of Incentive Regulation in electricity networks: The story so far Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Haikel Khalfallah Editeur : Grenoble : EDDEN Année de publication : 2013 Collection : Cahiers de recherche num. 9/2013 Importance : 25 p. Langues : Anglais (eng) Descripteurs : Thésaurus EDDEN
ANALYSE COUT-EFFICACITE ; ENERGIE ELECTRIQUE ; INNOVATION ; REGULATION ; RESEAU ELECTRIQUETags : incentive regulation electricity cost efficiency quality innovation Index. décimale : 42 ELECTRICITE Résumé : Network regulation is playing an active role in a context of restructuring energy systems for long term transition to a smart grid. Regulation of network companies' activities should consider both cost efficiency objectives and other objectives such as quality and network innovation. It is in this context that incentive regulation tools are discussed and assessed in this paper. The aim is to show their key features and how they could be aligned with the main regulation goals. This paper concludes that they should be considered as complementary tools to address conflicting regulatory aspects in an efficient manner. Nature du document : document de travail Site d'origine : edden En ligne : http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00931301 Permalink : https://clareco-grenoble.centredoc.fr/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=79145 An assessment of Incentive Regulation in electricity networks: The story so far [texte imprimé] / Haikel Khalfallah . - Grenoble : EDDEN, 2013 . - 25 p.. - (Cahiers de recherche; 9/2013) .
Langues : Anglais (eng)
Descripteurs : Thésaurus EDDEN
ANALYSE COUT-EFFICACITE ; ENERGIE ELECTRIQUE ; INNOVATION ; REGULATION ; RESEAU ELECTRIQUETags : incentive regulation electricity cost efficiency quality innovation Index. décimale : 42 ELECTRICITE Résumé : Network regulation is playing an active role in a context of restructuring energy systems for long term transition to a smart grid. Regulation of network companies' activities should consider both cost efficiency objectives and other objectives such as quality and network innovation. It is in this context that incentive regulation tools are discussed and assessed in this paper. The aim is to show their key features and how they could be aligned with the main regulation goals. This paper concludes that they should be considered as complementary tools to address conflicting regulatory aspects in an efficient manner. Nature du document : document de travail Site d'origine : edden En ligne : http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00931301 Permalink : https://clareco-grenoble.centredoc.fr/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=79145 Réservation
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Code-barres Cote Support Localisation Section Disponibilité E 001851 E45238 OUVRAGE EDDEN Fonds général Disponible Implementing incentive regulation through an alignment with resource bounded regulators / Jean-Michel Glachant ; Haikel Khalfallah ; Yannick Perez ; Vincent Rious ; Marcelo Saguan / 2013
Titre : Implementing incentive regulation through an alignment with resource bounded regulators Type de document : texte imprimé Auteurs : Jean-Michel Glachant ; Haikel Khalfallah ; Yannick Perez ; Vincent Rious ; Marcelo Saguan Année de publication : 2013 Note générale : Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, vol. 14, n°3 (2013), pp. 265-291 Langues : Anglais (eng) Descripteurs : Thésaurus EDDEN
MONOPOLE ; REGULATION ; RESEAU ; RESEAU ELECTRIQUE ; RESEAU GAZIERTags : INCENTIVE REGULATION BOUNDED REGULATOR REGULATORY ENDOWMENT NETTWORK TASKS REGULATORY ALIGNMENT Index. décimale : 42 ELECTRICITE Résumé : It is puzzling today to explain both the diversity and the rationale of regulators' practice vis-à-vis network monopolies. We argue that two fundamental characteristics should be considered when defining the most appropriate regulatory tools. First, it is the bounded endowment of regulators set by governments and legislators which determines their abilities (staff, budget, administrative powers) to implement any of the regulatory tools. Ranked from the easiest to the most demanding to implement, these various tools are: a- cost plus, b- price/revenue cap, c- output or performance-based regulation, d- menu of contracts and e- yardstick competition. Second, the regulators also have to take into account that the network monopolies perform multiple tasks with heterogeneous regulatory characteristics (in terms of controllability, ex ante predictability and ex post observability). These characteristics of tasks determine what type of regulatory tool is more likely to better regulate each task. The regulatory tools then perform well only when they are implemented for tasks that are controllable and predictable enough. It is the kind of observability of these tasks which determines the best incentive tool to implement. Lastly, conclusions for the regulation of networks are derived. A workable regulation of network relies on a reasonable alignment of the regulatory tools with the regulatory characteristics of tasks and the regulators resource endowment. Nature du document : article Site d'origine : edden En ligne : http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00767872 Permalink : https://clareco-grenoble.centredoc.fr/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=78470 Implementing incentive regulation through an alignment with resource bounded regulators [texte imprimé] / Jean-Michel Glachant ; Haikel Khalfallah ; Yannick Perez ; Vincent Rious ; Marcelo Saguan . - 2013.
Competition and Regulation in Network Industries, vol. 14, n°3 (2013), pp. 265-291
Langues : Anglais (eng)
Descripteurs : Thésaurus EDDEN
MONOPOLE ; REGULATION ; RESEAU ; RESEAU ELECTRIQUE ; RESEAU GAZIERTags : INCENTIVE REGULATION BOUNDED REGULATOR REGULATORY ENDOWMENT NETTWORK TASKS REGULATORY ALIGNMENT Index. décimale : 42 ELECTRICITE Résumé : It is puzzling today to explain both the diversity and the rationale of regulators' practice vis-à-vis network monopolies. We argue that two fundamental characteristics should be considered when defining the most appropriate regulatory tools. First, it is the bounded endowment of regulators set by governments and legislators which determines their abilities (staff, budget, administrative powers) to implement any of the regulatory tools. Ranked from the easiest to the most demanding to implement, these various tools are: a- cost plus, b- price/revenue cap, c- output or performance-based regulation, d- menu of contracts and e- yardstick competition. Second, the regulators also have to take into account that the network monopolies perform multiple tasks with heterogeneous regulatory characteristics (in terms of controllability, ex ante predictability and ex post observability). These characteristics of tasks determine what type of regulatory tool is more likely to better regulate each task. The regulatory tools then perform well only when they are implemented for tasks that are controllable and predictable enough. It is the kind of observability of these tasks which determines the best incentive tool to implement. Lastly, conclusions for the regulation of networks are derived. A workable regulation of network relies on a reasonable alignment of the regulatory tools with the regulatory characteristics of tasks and the regulators resource endowment. Nature du document : article Site d'origine : edden En ligne : http://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00767872 Permalink : https://clareco-grenoble.centredoc.fr/index.php?lvl=notice_display&id=78470 Exemplaires
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